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A reader alerted me to the fact that I am in this PBS Frontline feature on Afghanistan. If you do not know the work of Marcela Gaviria and Martin Smith, you should, because their team -- producers and cameramen and everyone else -- has done some of the very best journalism of this war. Enduring, legendary, Bernard Fall-type stuff, really. Just watch some of this footage.
Amazing... has there been any good analysis of how operations are going in Helmand province, are we actually achieving our goals? Also is there any analysis over how the people are reacting to us? From the video it seemed to be more a response of avoidance. I guess that's better than active opposition, but for COIN to work effectively we need at least acceptance and ideally cooperation, correct?
I haven't seen a whole lot of commentary on it. Joe Klein's article was one, but seemed very critical of the choice to go into Helmand province.
and why is it that you can always tell when a power point slide was created by an Officer; i.e. you have no clue what it's actually trying to say...
I'll be honest, when I first saw that combat footage, I was in awe. Truly some of the best I have ever seen.
More combat scenes of E-company from this past summer: http://www.vbs.tv/watch/vbs-news/obama-s-war
34 minutes, includes commentary.
this is why i don't make fun of disgusted, even though i disagree with him.
They forgot to mention that you're a member of Hamas and Hezbollah and the Taliban.
Visitor at 8:55,
Thank you for the link. At the 11 minute mark you get to see some real leadership and bad-assery. Dude is puking heavily, and 2 seconds later calls his men up to move out and fight.
Recognizing my ilk, I'm registering my comment to this post under "On Wingnuts (Updated)" below.
Fondly,
Dwight Whayle
the scene around 18:30 is quite telling and illustrates how we really don't have a fucking clue about the Afghani population. the July Helmand operation was supposed to be a big deal right, then why are these Marines stuck with a translator who barely speaks English and doesn't even know the local dialect. its a joke. I wish the COIN industry would be a little more honest about our limitations in this area. the US military right now knows about as much about the Afghani population as it did about the Vietnamese population. if the Taliban saw some of this footage they'd probably laugh their heads off. having Marines shake people's hands...yeah that's really gonna go a long way in the big picture.
actually, I thought the shaking hands part was one of the better small things they did right. The afghani's who stood up to shake their hands seemed to be pleasantly surprised and interested. I think small things like that can go a long way. Is it in their culture to shake hands? Well, I'll be honest I don't really know, but I think they obviously saw it as a sign of respect from the Americans (they're faces and body language looked that way at least) and I do know most foreigners understand that shaking hands is a sign of mutual respect and greeting for Americans (although they might not understand the difference between a firm handshake and a light, I'm going to hold your hand for a minute here, haha...) Now, one problem that seemed to come up to me was the frustration that the squad leader was showing when trying to communicate with that small group of Afghani's. It carried over in their body language and seemed to interfere with dealing with them, although it's very understandable why he was frustrated. He might have been better served though to not have shown that, instead focus on them getting confortable with him over the longterm.
Speaking again of shaking hands though, it's another thing I noticed from the video from General McCrystal's 60 minute interview when he spoke with that group of Afghani's in the market. They really seemed to light up when he walked up to them, shook their hands. His demenor was very calm and welcoming (big smile on his face), and that seemed to really put them at ease, and got them talking...
Noah Schactman's comments for each photo in the gallery is outstanding.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/10/gallery-afghanistan/
I'll add a bit to CN's comment.
A couple of thoughts on engaging the populace:
1. Tthe squad leader should take off his body armor, helmet, glasses, and gloves when talking to the locals. Yes, one assumes some risks, but his men can pull perimeter.
2. I always tried to mimick everything my locals did from the way they sit, to how they hold their cigarettes, to how they laugh. It just helps you fit in. In this case, he may need to start squatting instead of standing up lecturing. He's not talking to his joes.
3. I doubt the interpreter issue is one the Marines are happy with. It's probably more of a resource problem (i.e. they can't find enough willing to venture to Helmand Province).
4. Is the commander going out? The commander's role is to find whoever's in charge and start to engage him.
On the tactical side (this is more speculation as I'm just monday-morning quarterbacking a video and not on the ground),
1. The squad is throwing down a lot of suppressive fire often without seeing the enemy. It's often better to wait and try to positively identify rather than to spray a mad minute. Listening to the incoming rate of fire, they're probably facing 2 guys with AKs and 1 with a PKM. Just 3 dudes, not 50.
2. Frequency/variation of patrols. In a limited space, it is challenge to NOT get into a routine. When my troop averaged 12 patrols a dayat the peak of the Surge, I found myself planning the same patrols at the same time so I switched it. I made my 1SGT, PLs, and PSGs responsible for making the patrol schedule. Then, I could spot check it and ensure we maintained the frequency but kept up the variance. It worked.
3. Ambushes. I'd start having men covertly infiltrate into the treeline at night, dig in, and wait for the Taliban to occupy their ambush position the next day. A second option is to have preplanned indirect targets in known ambush positions. If the Taliban is going there, the locals will stay away, and one does not risk civilian casualties. A third option is to send recce patrols past the treeline to start observing the Taliban's infiltration. They ain't appearing out of thin air.
Just some quick thoughts from Mike's world of Coin. My comments are not to criticize/critique those Marines working their butts off. Rather, it is to provide some of my lessons learned for the group on the tactical level of COIN.
v/r
Mike Few
At around min 2:36 that is a real near miss....
I, too, would consider any documentary that featured me to be the best ever.
Echo company in Southern Helmand.
Also, 'Black Watch soldiers destroy Taleban stronghold in dramatic raid in Kandahar'
From The Scotsman: "Above all, the combination of the canny Jock in Kandahar' on the ground and surveillance from the air has delivered a physical and psychological blow to the insurgents' credibility in what they consider to be their safe haven."
Where in the video is the stuff on AM?
Agree completey with CN and points 1 and 2 by Mike F.
On point 3 by Mike F:
3. I doubt the interpreter issue is one the Marines are happy with. It's probably more of a resource problem (i.e. they can't find enough willing to venture to Helmand Province).
Sure, I agree the Marines are far from happy about the quality of interpreters they get. But they KNOW that going in. Showing clear frustration and hostility toward the Afghans, who by the way were sitting there attentively and respectfully, is completely counter-productive to the pop-centric coin they are allegedly implementing.
@cn:
Actually Afghans are huggers and close-talkers, especially with people they know well. With those you don't, you're better off with the two-handed handshake, as opposed to the one-hander.
@MikeF:
It would have been better to squat or kneel and ditching the shades while talking. Still, I've seen a lot worse.
@Aarun:
Don't sell Afghans short on intelligence, either. Having seen a few of those interactions by now, I tend to look at them more through Afghan eyes. What they were probably thinking was, "this guy's angry because he's got a bad terp," rather than taking it personally. They probably even had a good laugh about it after he left.
"they're probably facing 2 guys with AKs and 1 with a PKM. "
I thought I spotted some outgoing PKM fire there as well. Unless the US has a bare-barrelled 7.62.
I totally agree with MikeF, and getting bent out of shape at the poor interpreter in front of everyone probably isn't creating a lot of trust between these two groups. Still, the poor Marine is obviously sweating his ass off and was probably told he isn't allowed to take off his PPE when doing these rather pointless overly-aggressive KLEs.
It's funny that the Marines seem perplexed that people wouldn't want to live RIGHT NEXT to their COP. Hmm... what usually happens to COPs... they get mortared and rocketed every night! Yeah, sounds like a great place to live (location, location, location, right?). You gotta be kidding me. I was so enthusiastic about this surge, but we appear to be pissing it right down our pants.
Kilo
NZ will not have many friends in Pakistan today.
the coin effectiveness of the perception created by the smile and handshake should be not set against the cultural norms of the civilian's greeting rituals, but against the greeting rituals usually associated with soldiers of an invading power.
i suggest that the power of the smile and handshake should be measured by the dissonance it causes in the civilian who expected to be ignored, aimed at, shot, beaten with a rifle butt, tortured, raped, or otherwise traumatised. Have not really read too many smile and handshake anecdotes from the Soviet occupation period.
I have read many from the US Vietnam experience, but these were usually bummers as the civilian in question would be firebombed a few hours later by a separate and unenlightened arm of the occupation project.
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