New CNAS Report Evaluates Escalation Management in Protracted War Over Taiwan

Washington, August 6, 2024 — Today, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a new report, Over the Brink: Escalation Management in a Protracted War, by Andrew Metrick, Philip Sheers, and Stacie Pettyjohn.

The United States is entering a new era of nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific as the People's Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal, heightening the risks of nuclear coercion and escalation. Building on the authors’ previous work on U.S.-PRC nuclear escalation risks and prolonged conflict, this report scrutinizes the United States’ ability to manage nuclear coercion in a hypothetical protracted conflict over Taiwan.

The report finds that a prolonged U.S.-PRC conflict could make nonstrategic nuclear weapons more appealing to the PRC and create escalation dynamics that are harder for the United States to manage. The unique deterrence dynamics in the Indo-Pacific create the possibility for theater nuclear exchanges to occur without escalation to a full-scale nuclear war.

The authors argue that advanced conventional arms and evolving nuclear capabilities have created the “conventional-nuclear crossfade” where escalation risks are highly uncertain and nonlinear. In fact, the escalation risks from conventional strikes may outweigh those from nuclear operations rending limited nuclear use both more credible and tolerable.

Against this start backdrop, the study found that the United States lacks the necessary doctrine, capabilities, and strategies to handle this evolving nuclear landscape. The report also emphasizes the importance of U.S. allies and partners in maintaining deterrence and alliance cohesion, highlighting the need for better coordination and planning.

The report concludes with key findings and policy recommendations, urging the United States to improve nuclear fluency and competency among operational commanders and senior political leaders. It stresses that effective intrawar deterrence requires difficult conversations, pragmatic planning, and potentially the development of new nuclear systems.

For more information or to arrange an interview with the report authors, please contact Alexa Whaley at [email protected].