Creating a Multinational Shipbuilding Coalition

This commentary piece is part of CNAS’s The Pitch: A Competition of New Ideas. The author, Julian Graham, won Best in Show at the 2024 competition.

American power and prosperity are tied directly to its strength as a maritime power, making the U.S. Navy the most important hard power cog in the American grand strategy machine. In recent years, the Navy’s ship numbers have stagnated and dwindled. This decline comes on the heels of a collapse in American shipbuilding as an aging and retiring workforce, as well as underinvestment, have led to the closure of shipyards.¹

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the United States’ primary geostrategic competitor, and its emergence as a maritime power poses an unprecedented challenge to American global leadership. Central to the goals of competing with China, defending U.S. allies, and protecting mare liberum —or freedom of the seas—is the growth and maintenance of a modern and effective naval fighting force. Seapower is the foundation of American global leadership and has been critical to both commercial growth and national security. A diminished shipbuilding industry restricts the United States’ ability to project power around the world, including coming to the defense of allies and ensuring the free flow of commerce.

China has more than 200 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States and by 2030 will have grown its navy to approximately 435 ships, while the U.S. Navy will have stagnated at around 290.² The United States has also fallen behind in commercial shipbuilding, whereas China’s industrial sector is able to build more ships than the rest of the world combined.³ The U.S. Navy is beset by two problems: a backlog on maintenance of existing ships, which limits its ability to field a high percentage of its fleet, and a lagging shipbuilding complex. (Since 2019, the time it takes to build a Virginia-class submarine has risen from 68 months per boat to 85 months.)⁴

Revitalizing American shipbuilding requires innovative solutions that are politically unpalatable but nevertheless necessary. Shipbuilding not only supports key political constituencies—unions, for example—but has also been an industry of symbolic importance for great powers. The time frame for renewing America’s shipyards is too long to meet the needs of the moment. Instead, the U.S. Navy must look to an immediate solution with antecedents in ancient Greece. In 477 BCE, the Greek city-states formed a naval alliance led by Athens, which collected tributes from its members in the form of money and men that were put toward a naval coalition.⁵ Athens built the ships and led them in the defense of the seas around Greece. Today, this alliance is known as the Delian League, and the example of pooling allied resources to support naval construction is one the United States should follow.

Just as the Athenians would use lumber and workers from allied states, the United States should use allied shipyards for the construction and repair of military vessels. For example, the South Korean shipbuilding industry has made significant investments in technology to increase efficiency and productive capacity, “set[ting] the global industry standard,” as former Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro highlighted.⁶ Working with shipbuilders in allied countries would accelerate development of the U.S. fleet, while extending the U.S. security umbrella and binding allied nations closer to Washington. The additional revenue for South Korean shipbuilders would provide an economic incentive, while deepening ties would act as a further deterrent against North Korean aggression, which has increased recently.⁷

This model would also apply to working with Japan and other allied nations. Building and repairing ships in allied shipyards would not only deepen U.S. ties with allies but also increase in-theater options for ship repairs in the event of an armed conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than being transported back to the United States, vessels could remain in theater, reducing the time taken to return ships to combat readiness. The presence of U.S. ships in the region would have an additional deterrent effect on the hostile actions of China in the South China Sea, such as its harassment of Philippine vessels and regular incursions into the waters of sovereign states in the region.⁸

To accomplish this, the U.S. president can issue a waiver allowing the construction of armed vessels in foreign shipyards.⁹ This way, the United States can leverage the shipbuilding capacities and technological investments of allied countries to accelerate construction and repair while also reinvesting in its own shipyards. Doing so would free up American shipbuilders to invest in the future, rather than simply maintaining the present—an investment that would also benefit union members, even though union leaders have expressed opposition to building ships overseas.

The United States needs to invest in its shipbuilding industry at every level, from training workers to purchasing high-end equipment. It is vital that America has a strong domestic shipbuilding industry, but the present state of the sector is insufficient for the maritime security needs of the coming decades. This is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. Navy only requested one Virginia-class submarine in its FY 2025 budget request—down from two in FY 2024—because of the belief that the domestic industrial base cannot deliver more than one vessel.¹⁰ Investments from the federal government and from private sector actors will take time to yield results—in the meantime, the United States can leverage the capacity of overseas shipyards while taking the time to build a durable and thriving U.S. shipbuilding industry. Tariffs alone will not restore American shipbuilding; nor will a zero-sum or singular approach. Working with allies on a bilateral and multilateral basis through alliance structures will promote investment that benefits participating countries and delivers the restoration of American shipbuilding prowess that U.S. national security needs.

This approach is already playing out in the November 2024 agreement between the United States, Canada, and Finland to construct polar icebreakers that will be used for joint purposes in the Arctic Ocean.¹¹ The United States could build icebreakers in domestic shipyards, but that would detract from capacity needed elsewhere. America has joint interests in the Arctic with Canada and Finland; working with Helsinki and Ottawa to build the ships necessary to counter Russia’s activity in the region strengthens NATO’s Arctic defense in an efficient way.

AUKUS—the defense partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—is another example of how the United States can integrate its shipbuilding industry and expertise with those of its allies. Under Pillar I of AUKUS, the United States and the United Kingdom will enable Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, providing shared economic and security benefits for all three partner countries.¹² America’s multilateral alliance structures allow the United States to invest in naval capacity with its allies and partners to leverage their comparative advantages and shared interests—ultimately benefiting the United States as well as its allies and partners across the globe.

While the United States has historically been able to produce large quantities of ships, quality and efficiency have been consistent hurdles.¹³ Partnering with overseas nations and shipbuilders would not be done to the neglect of domestic shipyards. Working with foreign shipbuilders would yield results for American shipyards through technology sharing and adoption of best practices that increase efficiency in the development of crewed and autonomous vessels.

Revitalizing the U.S. shipbuilding industry requires taking bold and unprecedented action, but that is what this moment needs. The precipitous decline in America’s ability to build and maintain a world-leading navy is an existential threat to American power. The fundamental pillar of American strength remains its global network of allies and partners. Using allied shipyards while the United States invests in its own will provide a platform for American naval power in the 21st century and ensure that the United States retains naval supremacy.

About the Author

Julian Graham is a communications and government relations professional working as a director at Signal Group. He provides public affairs support to international and domestic clients on foreign policy, international trade, energy, financial services, and technology policy. His hobbies include coaching the Georgetown Rugby team and hosting the Uncommon Decency podcast, which analyzes European politics. He also writes the Global Compass substack.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to express their gratitude for the comments and insights of the following people whose contributions were vital to the publication of this paper: Adam Tong, Michael Borja, German De La Roche, and Kristin Green. This report was made possible with general support to CNAS.

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About the Pitch

CNAS began The Pitch: A Competition of New Ideas in 2020 to elevate emerging and diverse voices in national security. Students and early-career professionals from across a variety of sectors submit innovative policy ideas to meet new challenges in U.S. national security policy. Selected applicants pitch their ideas in front of a distinguished panel of judges and a live audience. The judges and audience select heat winners, the audience choice winner, and best in show. Competitors will also have their ideas featured in official CNAS products and social media.