January 24, 2025

Don’t Talk About the War

Nothing better illustrates the German political establishment’s lack of seriousness about strategy and defense than Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s reelection campaign. He portrays himself as a friedenskanzler, or chancellor of peace, who has successfully kept Germany out of the Russia-Ukraine war. To emphasize the peacemaking theme, one of his first acts after launching his campaign was to call Russian President Vladimir Putin—to the consternation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Germany’s Western allies, who have begun to exclude Berlin and its lame-duck chancellor in their deliberations.

The conversation with Putin went nowhere, of course. Almost three years since the start of the war, Scholz and his circle of advisors appear unwilling to face a simple truth: Confronting aggressors and getting them to the negotiation table requires both carrots and sticks—in other words, diplomacy and military power. For many decades, Germany’s leadership, opinion-makers, and much of the policy establishment have primarily seen security policy through the prism of diplomacy, dialogue, and economic exchange. This remains a profound problem for Germany because it impairs Berlin’s readiness for the return of large-scale war to the continent—both the hybrid war that Moscow is already fighting against Europe today and the hot war that Western intelligence chiefs consider increasingly possible.

Confronting aggressors and getting them to the negotiation table requires both carrots and sticks—in other words, diplomacy and military power.

This raises the risk that Berlin reaps the opposite of what it intends. By avoiding any semblance of preparation for the eventuality of war, Germany has stripped itself of the ability to deter one. That makes war in Europe more likely, not less.

Scholz and much of the German elite seem to have precious little understanding of what a future war with Russia could look like. They appear to grasp neither how a war would be fought, nor the need for preparedness on the home front. This includes dealing with everything from the effects of missile and drone strikes to cyberattacks, assassinations, and widespread sabotage against German civilian and military infrastructure.

Read the full article on Foreign Policy.

  • Commentary
    • January 22, 2025
    Sharper: Trump's First 100 Days

    Donald Trump takes office in a complex and volatile global environment. Rising tensions with China, the continued war in Ukraine, and instability in the Middle East all pose s...

    By Charles Horn

  • Commentary
    • January 20, 2025
    Build a High-Low Mix to Enhance America’s Warfighting Edge and Deter China

    The Trump administration can take immediate actions to improve U.S. military capability, capacity, and warfighting to deter China and reverse negative trends in military power...

    By Stacie Pettyjohn, Carlton Haelig, Becca Wasser & Josh Wallin

  • Podcast
    • January 16, 2025
    Defense & Aerospace Air Power Podcast: Doctor, Doctor, Give Me the News:

    On this podcast, they continue looking ahead to airpower issues in the coming year with Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn, Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American ...

    By Stacie Pettyjohn

  • Commentary
    • War on the Rocks
    • January 15, 2025
    The United States Can’t Afford to Not Harden Its Air Bases

    The United States can continue to largely ignore this menace and watch as risk levels increase, or it can face the reality and shape its forces and infrastructure to prevail....

    By Tom Shugart & Timothy A. Walton

View All Reports View All Articles & Multimedia