August 06, 2024
Into the unknown: Managing conventional and nuclear uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific
The war in Ukraine has reminded the public that nuclear arms remain useful tools of international statecraft. It is noteworthy that Russia’s nuclear threats, while yet unfulfilled, have included both tactical and strategic nuclear systems, demonstrating that nuclear signaling occurs at multiple levels with a diverse array of systems — but also fitting into an existing understanding of nuclear doctrine.
More complex is the question of how leaders in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) view their nuclear arsenal. The PRC is building hundreds of new missile silos, deploying new theater-range ballistic missiles, and potentially developing low-yield warheads. As the DoD’s 2023 report on Chinese military power puts it, the PRC’s “current efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity.”
Rather than dismiss, ignore, or overlook conventional-nuclear integration discussions, US operational leaders must understand that China’s nuclear future is dangerous and uncertain, and that the United States is ill-prepared for this ambiguous future
This combination of ambiguous nuclear modernization and ongoing conventional transformation creates dangerous escalation pathways that the United States is ill-prepared to manage. The age of nuclear systems being defined by Cold War thinking is over, and Washington’s understanding of how China views its nuclear arsenal needs to change accordingly.
The final destination of the PRC’s nuclear modernization is the subject of continued debate. While it remains unknown whether the PRC will depart from its traditional No First Use policy, a greater variety of modernized nuclear capabilities affords their leadership the ability to quickly evolve their nuclear doctrine to include coercive nuclear signaling and asymmetric escalation. Simply put, a modernized nuclear arsenal expands their available deterrent and coercive options, and Washington should not be complacent to believe that overt nuclear coercion is a uniquely Russian tactic.
Read the full article from Breaking Defense.
More from CNAS
-
More than the Sum of its Parts: Developing a Coordinated U.S.-Australian Response to Potential Chinese Aggression
Commentary
If China engaged in a war of aggression, the United States, Australia, and other nations would not have much time to develop a coordinated response....
By Stacie Pettyjohn
-
It’s Time for a True Industrial Strategy for American National Security
Commentary
For an industrial strategy to work, the president must make it a White House priority that pulls together all elements of national power....
By Becca Wasser & Mara Rudman
-
Aiming higher: Accelerating US-Australia cooperation on precision-guided weapons
Commentary
Both the United States and Australia have made deterring coercion in the Indo-Pacific the focus of their defence strategies and plan to do so by denying an aggressor the abili...
By Stacie Pettyjohn
-
There Are No Magic Beans: Easy Options to Deter China Militarily Do Not Exist
Commentary
The only assured way to deter an attack on Taiwan is to have sufficient survivable forces and munitions properly postured before a Chinese attack....
By Tom Shugart
