September 18, 2018
Iran Hawks Could Make a Bad Situation Worse
More pressure on Tehran won’t work. Here’s what Trump should really do.
One of U.S. President Donald Trump’s chief foreign-policy objectives is to persuade or force the Iranian government to abandon policies that pose a threat to U.S. interests—namely, the country’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs as well as its support for terrorists in the region. To this end, the administration has pulled the United States out of the nuclear deal achieved under President Barack Obama, reimposed sanctions on Iran, and undertaken a pressure campaign to try to force Iran back to the negotiating table to strike a new bargain.
In its efforts to cajole Iran, however, the United States could be making a mistake if it assumes that more pressure will automatically bring it closer to its goals. Particularly when it comes to measures aimed at Iran’s nuclear program, more pressure could heighten nuclear risks and further drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies.
In the months leading up to and since Trump’s announcement that he was pulling the United States out of the nuclear deal, many Iran watchers have taken to the pages of prominent foreign-policy outlets, including this one, to argue for or against the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran deal and provide recommendations for what the United States should do next. Advocates of the tough approach, such as Mark Dubowitz of the Federation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the Council on Foreign Relations’ Ray Takeyh, see economic sanctions and political isolation as critical to achieving a new, better deal or compelling the regime to change its policies by other means.
Although some experts, such as Dubowitz and his FDD colleague Richard Goldberg, have offered specific suggestions, there doesn’t appear to be a consensus on what sanctions and isolation should entail in practice. In addition, such observers have paid relatively little attention to how the United States should execute what will likely be a yearslong campaign of maximum pressure aimed at a new deal while mitigating the risks of Iranian nuclear advances and further provocations that such a strategy will likely produce. In essence, observers may be losing sight of the broader objective and thus offering some counterproductive ideas.
Read the Full Article at Foreign Policy
More from CNAS
-
What Does Yahya Sinwar’s Death Mean for the War in Gaza?
Podcast
Jonathan Lord, Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security program, joins RN Drive to discuss the death of Sinwar who has long been viewed as one of the militant gr...
By Jonathan Lord
-
Russia in the Middle East with Jonathan Lord and Hanna Notte
Podcast
One year after the October 7 attacks by Hamas, the crisis in the Middle East has grown more and more complex. With the region teetering on the brink of broader conflict, the B...
By Jonathan Lord, Hanna Notte, Andrea Kendall-Taylor & Jim Townsend
-
A Year of Anguish for the Hostages in Gaza—and Their Families
Commentary
October 7 gave rise to unexpected bipartisan coalitions of D.C. experts and legislators who lent their knowledge to help U.S. hostage families and victims of the conflict navi...
By Daniel Silverberg
-
Biden Urges Israel Not to Attack Iran Nuclear Sites
Video
Rachel Ziemba joins Bloomberg Television to discuss oil rising for a third day as traders watch for supply risks in the Middle East. Watch the full episode from Bloomberg Tel...
By Rachel Ziemba
