More than the Sum of its Parts: Developing a Coordinated U.S.-Australian Response to Potential Chinese Aggression

Backed by its growing military strength, China has increasingly engaged in coercive and belligerent behavior in the Indo-Pacific region.¹ Beyond its frequent use of gray zone tactics to harass and intimidate neighbors, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claims have heightened fears that it might start a war to subjugate Taiwan or forcibly seize disputed features in the East or South China Seas.²

The 2022 United States National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified competition with China as the nation’s priority challenge and recognized that U.S. forces alone cannot successfully deter or, if necessary, defeat Chinese aggression. The U.S. NDS categorizes allies and partners as “a center of gravity of the strategy” and an asymmetric American strength.³ Similarly, the Australian 2024 National Defence Strategy makes deterrence by denial the priority mission, and echoes the conclusion of the Defense Strategic Review that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is currently “not fully fit for purpose.”⁴ The Ministry of Defence also maintained that “Australia must work even more closely with our international partners” and that it would “deepen and expand” military cooperation with the United States.⁵

To realize these goals, Australia and the United States have agreed to work together to co-produce munitions through Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise (GWEO).⁶ Additionally, AUKUS, the trilateral arrangement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, will provide nuclear-powered attack submarines for Canberra and enhanced technological cooperation among the three allies.⁷ Although American-Australian military cooperation appears to be rapidly deepening, true strategic integration, which is critical for all other forms of military cooperation, remains inadequate.

Becca Wasser and I defined strategic integration between allies as a “common understanding of threats and prioritization among them and a coordinated division of labor for responding to these challenges.”⁸ Strategic integration is the most difficult type of cooperation to achieve—particularly in peacetime—given that each nation has its own interests and desire to protect its sovereignty. The strongest form of American-Australian strategic integration—a firm and public precommitment to combined defensive operations—is not likely feasible given political realities. However, even less formal forms of strategic alignment can enhance the credibility of combined deterrent threats and help to ensure that other forms of military cooperation support the objectives identified at the strategic level. A shared understanding of threats, roles, and responsibilities among alliance partners should shape other forms of institutional and tactical cooperation, so that every level of effort works towards shared goals. For instance, Canberra and Washington would ideally agree to co-develop and co-produce weapons that each party would need in priority scenarios, such as maritime strike and air defense missiles.⁹ Similarly, combined exercises should practice operations that are relevant to priority scenarios, and Australian and American forces should assume their likely roles and practice operating together as envisioned by plans.

Read the full report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.