From Mardi Gras to the Philippines: A Review of DHS Homeland Security Investigations

HSI is a division of ICE and, according to the fiscal year (FY) 2022 congressional budget justification, is the “principal criminal investigative agency within” DHS.⁶ The other division in ICE is Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), which is primarily responsible for enforcing immigration laws and removing individuals not authorized to be inside the United States. HSI also has responsibilities to enforce immigration laws and is the complex investigative arm of ICE. HSI claims authority and capability to investigate nearly every significant federal crime, from cybercrime to sex trafficking, from intellectual property theft to drug trafficking. According to HSI public relations materials, if it involves “the illegal movement of people or goods,” then HSI investigates it.⁷ According to a former senior HSI special agent, HSI is “the most powerful law enforcement agency in the U.S.”⁸ A letter written by current and former HSI division chiefs in 2018 stated that the agency “arrests more criminal violators than any other federal investigative agency.”⁹ Whereas HSI has demonstrated expertise in transnational criminal investigations, it faces challenges in intergovernmental relationships due to its organizational placement within ICE, and it would benefit from a reinvigorated departmental leadership focus on investigative prioritization, oversight, and transparency.

Legal Authorities

HSI agents have extremely broad authorities to investigate federal crimes. HSI legal authorities, upon which investigations are authorized, are derived from immigration law enforcement authorities previously assigned to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was a component of the Justice Department, and the U.S. Customs Service, which was previously part of the Treasury Department. The Homeland Security Act of 2002,¹⁰ which created DHS, “merged the investigative and enforcement elements of the former U.S. Customs Service (Customs) and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).”¹¹ In 2004, former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge delegated a wide range of authorities related to immigration and law enforcement to the assistant secretary of ICE. Although HSI in its current format and division title did not exist at the time, DHS interprets the delegation as sufficient for HSI to exercise its law enforcement authorities.¹²

HSI was created in 2010 from former ICE “Offices of Investigations, Intelligence, and International Affairs.”¹³ According to a joint review by the DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) inspectors general, “HSI holds broad legal authority to enforce over 400 statutes” covering a wide range of crimes.¹⁴

Title 19 is the section of the U.S. Code that governs customs enforcement activity. Customs officers have been responsible for interdicting stolen or smuggled goods both in the historical iteration of the Customs Service and in the DHS iteration, under the reorganized CBP component of DHS. HSI resides in ICE and uses as part of its authority Title 19 customs authorities to conduct investigations.¹⁵ Consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, customs officers have had historically wide discretion to conduct warrantless searches at the border. HSI officers are authorized to use customs authorities to conduct warrantless searches. As one former HSI executive put it, “border security is critical to the nation’s security.”¹⁶

Title 8 is the section of the U.S. Code that governs immigration enforcement activity. Immigration officers—who were previously part of INS and now are part of ICE—are responsible for identifying persons in the United States illegally, arrest and removal operations, and employer worksite immigration enforcement. Immigration officers, including “special agents” are authorized to also “patrol the border” (Homeland Security Act (HSA) Section 287(a)(3)),¹⁷ make arrests for immigration violations (HSA 287(a)(2)), make arrests “for felonies regulating the admission or removal of aliens” (HSA 287(a)(4)), make arrests “for any offense against the United States” (HSA 287(a)(5)(A)), make arrests “for any felony,” “conduct searches” (HSA 287(c)), “execute warrants” (HSA 287(a)), and “exercise the power to execute warrants of criminal arrests for non-immigration violations issued under the authority of the United States.”¹⁸

DHS appears to consider a broad array of violations of federal law to be within HSI’s mission. Criminal law enforcement efforts that protect children from sexual exploitation, protect citizens from transnational gangs, protect intellectual property, and protect the economy and businesses from financial crime have all been interpreted by the department to be within HSI’s authority to investigate. According to an HSI training slide released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act in 2014, HSI, through its legacy customs officer authorities, in particular, interprets its authorities as a mandate to investigate “any federal crime.”¹⁹

The scope of complex criminal investigative activities is arguably out of alignment with the department’s core statutory mission, as well as its budget authorizations. As discussed in greater detail in the May 2020 report published by the Center for a New American Security, “Reforming the Department of Homeland Security Through Enhanced Oversight and Accountability,”²⁰ three of the seven provisions constituting the department’s core statutory mission pertain directly to terrorism.²¹ The seventh, which pertains to drug trafficking, concerns primarily the intersection of drug trafficking with terrorism. The department’s core statutory mission does not identify criminal investigation as a central component of the department’s mission, nor was law enforcement and investigations the motivating factor in creating the department. In contrast, the Justice Department is charged with the primary responsibility to prosecute crimes. Accordingly, most other major federal investigative agencies or bureaus—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)—reside within the Justice Department.²² And when DHS was created, responsibility for the investigation of terrorism-related crimes was expressly reserved for the FBI. Some informed observers assess that HSI, which never had authority to conduct terrorism investigations, carved out areas of investigative opportunity that other agencies were not addressing, as a result of those agencies’ other priorities.²³ As the Biden administration considers how to modernize DHS to best capitalize on its strengths and ensure that law enforcement activities are subject to appropriate oversight and accountability, consideration for updating HSI's organizational structure and prioritization is appropriate, as discussed further below.

HSI Investigations Snapshot

HSI investigations cover a broad array of criminal violations. According to a current HSI senior official, HSI’s strength resides in its competency in investigating violations of federal criminal law that have a transnational nexus.²⁴ Transnational criminal investigations take advantage of the division’s ability to leverage its border and immigration authorities. The exercise of those authorities, in connection with leveraging its international partnerships, has produced success at pursuing crimes of victimization that have a transnational aspect.²⁵

To an outside observer, some areas of HSI focus and engagement are more persuasive as being an integral part of a homeland security mission than others. There are a range of HSI investigative initiatives—from sex trafficking to counterfeit merchandise—that are clearly valid and important law enforcement objectives. Some of these, however, are less relevant to protecting against major homeland security threats facing the country. For example, in 2020, Mardi Gras in New Orleans was designated a special event assessment rating (SEAR)-2 event; the status enabled the HSI special agent in charge (SAC) to provide federal agents and resources, such as mobile command centers and access to a special response team (SRT), if needed, to state and local partners.²⁶ In addition to providing that physical security response, HSI placed significant emphasis on the disruption of human or sex trafficking activity surrounding the event. HSI investigative activity surrounding another major annual national event, the 2021 Super Bowl, included a significant disruption of counterfeit sports merchandise.²⁷ HSI leads the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center), which coordinates interagency and private-sector partners in disrupting counterfeit activity.

Human and drug trafficking are issues where HSI’s international partnerships, immigration and customs authorities, and focus on crimes of victimization come together for a substantial area of investigative activities. These activities have ranged from training Philippine law enforcement counterparts²⁸ to participating in a multi-agency international investigation leading to the arrest and conviction of notorious Mexican drug cartel leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman.²⁹

To provide a snapshot of HSI areas of priority investigation, the authors conducted a six-month review of press releases for HSI investigations, dated July 1, 2020, through December 31, 2020. Case summaries were reviewed on the basis of publicly available information from DHS’s ICE and DOJ’s websites. The authors analyzed press releases from ICE³⁰ and DOJ³¹ during the six-month period and identified 178 relevant press releases—157 from ICE and 21 from DOJ.

The authors note up front that using press releases as a basis for this case snapshot is intended to provide only a general overview of HSI activities, and that press releases do not provide precise measurements of all investigative activity during this period. For example, press releases generally do not include information about ongoing investigations that have not reached the arrest or prosecution stages. They also do not include all investigations where HSI supported other agencies. Moreover, the public releases appear to de-emphasize the immigration enforcement work engaged in by HSI in conjunction with its ICE counterpart, ERO. Finally, 2020 investigations and reporting may have been inconsistent with prior years’, given the operational and/or administrative effects of the coronavirus pandemic. The use of press releases is, however, a useful reference point for a summary assessment. For a full explanation of the methodology used, see Appendix II.

Both the ICE and DOJ websites categorized press releases based on the type of the HSI investigations. The categories used in this paper to classify the types of HSI investigations include:

• Child Exploitation
• Contraband
• Counter Proliferation Investigation Unit
• COVID-19
• Cultural Property, Arts, and Antiquities Investigations
• Cyber Crimes
• Document and Benefit Fraud
• Enforcement and Removal
• Financial Crimes
• Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives
• Human Rights Violators
• Human Smuggling/Trafficking
• Intellectual Property Rights and Commercial Fraud
• Narcotics
• National Security
• Operational
• Transnational Gangs
• Worksite Enforcement

In some instances, the categories provided by the ICE or DOJ websites did not fully capture the issue areas of the investigation, so the authors examined each press release and determined if it should be included in more than one category; some press releases were allotted to multiple categories. This method resulted in the 178 press releases being counted as 238 for purposes of categorization. The graph below depicts the categories and the numbers of investigations in each.

Publicly Announced Homeland Security Investigations Cases from July 1 to December 31, 2020

Of the 238 categories counted from the press releases during the six-month period, the vast majority were child exploitation and narcotics cases. These two categories accounted for 36 percent of the overall investigations reported—including arrests, charges, and prosecutions—during this time. In contrast, the six categories with the fewest publicly announced investigations—worksite enforcement; counter proliferation investigation unit; human rights violators; cultural property, arts, and antiquities investigations; operational; and transnational gangs—together accounted for just under 8 percent of categorized investigations.

The nine reported investigations described as falling in the national security category involved weapons-smuggling networks and weapons information theft,³² drive-by shootings,³³ terrorist financing,³⁴ and North Korean and Iranian sanction evasion.³⁵

There is some lack of consistency between the division’s activities as presented in the most recent budget justification, which includes discussion of “enforcement-related actions against employers that violate immigration-related employment laws,” and the investigative activities HSI emphasizes in its public relations communications. Whereas HSI public-facing materials focus on crimes of victimization, the department’s budget justification states that “[i]n FY2020, the ICE HSI worksite enforcement program initiated 4,326 new investigations and conducted 3,903 Form I-9 inspections that resulted in 1,001 arrests… HSI’s worksite enforcement strategy focuses on protecting the United States’ critical infrastructure, reducing the demand for illegal employment, and protecting employment opportunities for the lawful workforce.”³⁶ Accordingly, despite what may be HSI workforce preference for conducting investigations for which citizenship is irrelevant, the reality of the division’s day-to-day work, as reflected in the budget justification, is that HSI continues to be engaged in immigration enforcement work at the direction of component or departmental leadership objectives. A similar disconnect between the public-facing reporting and the day-to-day activities appears with respect to HSI investigation of gang activity, about which the budget justification states, “In FY 2020, HSI made 3,671 criminal arrests and 316 administrative arrests of gang members.”³⁷

In addition, while HSI frames its public messaging to characterize such crimes as intellectual property theft³⁸ and child exploitation³⁹ as falling into its mission to protect the homeland, these types of criminal violations—while extremely important—arguably stretch concepts of homeland security beyond a recognized conceptual framework.⁴⁰ Such a broad interpretation of an investigative mandate brings into question the usefulness of designating certain threats to citizens’ security and safety as homeland security issues. Every federal crime that has a transnational nexus is not necessarily a matter of national or homeland security. A narrower interpretation of areas of HSI enforcement could: (1) avoid duplication and overlap with other federal investigative agencies, thereby maximizing time and resources; (2) free up personnel to address core DHS mission areas; and (3) focus DHS leadership attention on core DHS mission areas.

Challenges

To improve both the quality of HSI’s work and its reputation among overseers, stakeholders, and partners, division leadership should pay attention to bolstering oversight and morale. From an outside observer’s perspective, the overemphasis on HSI’s promotional public-facing materials⁴¹ and lack of substantive information about its guidelines, policies, and procedures contribute to a lack of understanding about how the division operates, as well as how, as one of the largest investigative law enforcement components of the federal government, it holds its agents and operators accountable.⁴²

Oversight and Accountability

HSI regional division leaders—the SACs—have a significant degree of autonomy and independence in setting priorities and guiding investigations in their areas of responsibility. Although HSI investigative activities are generally organized into five categories—cyber and financial, exploitation and victimization, public safety, global trade, and national security and counterterrorism⁴³—they are extremely broad categories, and the department does not articulate how they are prioritized. Currently, there is no institutional mechanism for the DHS secretary to set investigative priorities for HSI.⁴⁴ Although the secretary has the authority to do so, there are not sufficient institutional formalized reporting structures to facilitate that level of direction and control. As a result, the oversight and attention that HSI activities garner at the secretary level are intensely personality driven, with some former DHS leadership teams having taken a substantial interest in HSI activities and others not.⁴⁵ Depending on the interest level of any particular DHS team, HSI investigative activities can be decentralized, with local and regional priorities set by SACs who operate divisions with a high degree of autonomy. The current decentralization of investigative priorities at the field level is reminiscent of a pre-9/11 FBI. In that instance, it took the attacks of September 11, 2001, to lead the FBI director to adopt a more headquarters-driven model of priority setting.

While current and former HSI officials assess that outside scrutiny is primarily motivated by the connection to the department’s immigration enforcement functions, from an outside observer’s perspective, a lack of transparency about HSI guidelines and practices also contributes to negative perceptions. Within the department, HSI is subject to oversight by the inspector general and by the ICE Office of Professional Responsibility, which is staffed by HSI agents assigned to that office.⁴⁶ HSI’s investigative activities are arguably not subject to adequate oversight, given the complexity of the investigations it conducts and the associated implications for civil liberties and privacy. HSI’s reputation and credibility among outside stakeholders would be improved by greater transparency about its guidelines, policies, and oversight.⁴⁷

The nature of HSI’s work also suggests that it should have oversight structures within the department that are appropriate for its mission and activities. Much of modern law enforcement requires the use of complex technologies, such as analytic tools to mine large datasets, facial recognition technologies, and surveillance tools. These technologies can provide valuable assistance to investigators—but they also involve complex sets of legal and privacy considerations. Moreover, federal (and state) law enforcement agencies increasingly turn to private-sector third parties that collect, retain, and analyze large datasets of individuals’ information. For example, news reports have described HSI’s contracting relationship with a company that provides software enabling large-scale analytic capability across datasets.⁴⁸ HSI’s current position within ICE appears as though it may allow for a sharing or availability of technical resources across HSI and ICE; this fluidity could create challenges in ensuring that information is used in line with a specific authorized purpose, with accompanying oversight and accountability.

Congressional oversight of HSI also may be somewhat obscured by the division’s position within ICE. Substantive oversight of ICE is more focused on the immigration issues under the purview of ERO. In addition, HSI’s budget is currently tied to those of ERO and ICE.⁴⁹ HSI, which conducts traditional law enforcement activity, is currently subject to oversight by the homeland security committees; it is not routinely subject to oversight of the congressional judiciary committees, which are the committees that often conduct oversight at the intersection of investigations, surveillance, and the legal process using third-party information, although a joint inspector general report on deconfliction was completed at the request of judiciary committee leadership.⁵⁰

Morale and Effectiveness

From the HSI perspective, the primary impediment to HSI’s ability to perform its work effectively is its organizational attachment to ERO and the reputational issues that accompany the persistent corrosive political debate surrounding immigration. In 2018, 19 HSI SACs sent a letter to then-Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen requesting that HSI be decoupled from ERO and ICE. The agents argued that “the two ICE sub-agencies [ERO and HSI] have become so specialized and independent that ICE’s mission can no longer be described as a singular synergistic mission…”⁵¹ As the SACs’ letter indicates, the precursor to HSI was the ICE Office of Investigations, which “had oversight of programs that supported ICE’s investigative and enforcement priorities…” But HSI investigations include those that go beyond supporting ICE enforcement activities. Some HSI agents believe that HSI has created an internationally recognized brand and that association with ICE not only tarnishes that brand but, most critically, has a detrimental practical impact on its ability to do its work. For example, as cities adopt regulations preventing cooperation with ICE, HSI cooperation with local law enforcement is affected.⁵² As one former HSI executive explained, “the investigation piece is poisoned by immigration” and the intense political issues surrounding it. There is a strong argument to be made that separating HSI from ICE would remove the operational challenges experienced by HSI when working with state and local partners, even on criminal investigations unrelated to immigration, such as child exploitation or gang homicide investigations.⁵³

Challenges to HSI’s effectiveness go beyond its organizational link with ERO, however. A 2019 joint investigation by the inspectors general of DHS and DOJ found that over one-third of surveyed agents from each agency on the southern border reported that “cooperation failures” between the agencies negatively affected operations.⁵⁴ The report found that unclear policies at both DHS and DOJ contributed to confusion about areas of overlapping jurisdiction and to competing missions and operations. And morale at DHS overall, according to a 2020 survey, is at rock bottom, with the department coming in last when ranked against other large federal agencies.⁵⁵ ICE ranks sixth out of 16 agencies within DHS, and 315th out of 411 agencies across the federal government.⁵⁶

Recommendations for Reform

Given the nature of HSI activities in the context of the DHS mission, and the challenges in morale, effectiveness, oversight, and accountability, as described above, the executive branch and Congress should explore paths to place HSI on stronger long-term footing. To depart from the status quo, the authors propose two alternative options for reform:

Remain and refocus: In the more modest of the two proposed options, HSI would retain its current organizational structure but would be subject to greater headquarters-driven prioritization and oversight.

Accordingly, the DHS secretary should direct the development of:

• a formal policy that sets investigative priorities for HSI, consistent with national policy priorities, departmental priorities, and the domestic and international threat landscape;
• a joint review, in collaboration with the attorney general, of overlapping areas of investigation among the law enforcement components of DHS and DOJ, and a resultant memorandum of agreement to reduce overlap and redundancy, particularly in the areas of transnational criminal investigation, intellectual property, child exploitation, narcotics, and financial crime; and
• an internal organizational mechanism requiring major cases and enforcement activity, to be briefed regularly to the secretary and/or deputy secretary.

To improve and institutionalize oversight over HSI activities, Congress should:

• legislate a requirement for the DHS secretary to develop and issue updated investigative guidelines, to be made publicly available, in consultation with the attorney general;
• implement reporting requirements on HSI use of surveillance technologies and associated policies, implementation, and oversight; and
• conduct further oversight in connection with budget authorizations to ensure that departmental investigative priorities are in sync with bona fide issues of homeland security, and that resources are not diverted to law enforcement activities that generate cases and prosecutions, but are tethered to actual threats to the health, safety, and security of the American public.

Separate and streamline: In this option, policymakers would adopt all of the recommendations above, and, in addition, Congress would establish HSI as a stand-alone investigative entity within DHS, separating it from ERO. A separated HSI should be led by a Senate-confirmed official, as is the case with HSI’s peer organizations at DOJ, such as the FBI, DEA, and ATF. The primary benefit of this option would be that HSI would remain the investigative arm of the department with its current authorities and capacity but would no longer be associated by law enforcement partners and the public with ERO’s immigration enforcement activities. With a renewed emphasis on prioritization, this new HSI would be a more focused entity that could build on core competencies while providing greater bureaucratic distance between immigration enforcement and investigations that are unrelated to immigration status or enforcement. Separation would also likely facilitate more focused oversight attention on HSI activities, specifically by internal and external overseers, including Congress.⁵⁷

Conclusion

Although the department was created to proactively protect the country from terrorism and other homeland security threats, DHS has grown into the federal government department with the largest law enforcement force. Its primary investigative arm, HSI, has over the past decade arguably expanded its activities beyond those that support the department’s component and mission, and now serves as a complex criminal investigative agency with global reach. This report provides two options for policy consideration as the new administration and Congress consider reforms to modernize the department.

Appendix I: DHS Homeland Security Investigations Organizational Overview

This brief organizational overview of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is intended to provide additional context to the narrative and recommendations in this report. It briefly describes HSI’s organizational structure, budget and personnel, and priority mission areas, and the mechanism for congressional oversight of the agency.

Leadership and Organizational Structure: HSI is part of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE is led by a director, who is a Senate-confirmed official and reports directly to the DHS secretary.⁵⁸ HSI is led by an executive associate director, who reports to the director of ICE. HSI has eight divisions: Domestic Operations, Intelligence, International Operations, Investigative Programs, Mission Support, National IPR Co-ordination Center, National Security Investigations, and Operational Technology and Cyber Division.⁵⁹

Budget and Personnel: In FY2021, HSI received $2.1 billion of ICE’s $8.3 billion budget.⁶⁰ In the FY2022 budget, the Biden administration is requesting the addition of 49 full-time employees and an increase in HSI’s budget of $28.9 million.⁶¹ HSI’s main focus is on domestic investigations. In FY2021, 7,905 of its 8,551 full-time employees operated under “Domestic Investigations,” and of the $2.1 billion HSI received, $1.8 billion was for domestic investigations, $186.6 million for international operations, and $98.1 million for intelligence.⁶²

Priority Mission Areas: ICE’s congressional budget justification establishes the main goals of HSI’s budget activities as preventing terrorism and protecting the homeland; preventing illicit trade, travel, and finance; and preventing the unlawful exploitation of the nation’s people by violators of immigration law.⁶³ It also outlines the key issues that HSI plans to focus on in FY2021: combating the opioid crisis, gang investigations, worksite enforcement, and innovation and optimization of operational support.⁶⁴

Congressional Oversight: The House Committee on Homeland Security and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) are the main committees with oversight of DHS. HSGAC holds hearings and confirms nominees for the position of director of ICE.

Appendix II: Methodology

The snapshot of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) created by the authors covers July 1, 2020, through December 31, 2020. It was created using only publicly available information from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Department of Justice (DOJ) websites. Because only publicly available information was used, the snapshot may have omitted some investigations by HSI during the timeframe, particularly national security–related cases that may contain sensitive or classified information. In addition, press releases do not include information about ongoing investigations that have not reached the arrest or prosecution stages, nor do they include all investigations where HSI supported other agencies. The press releases do, however, provide a useful reference point to provide a summary assessment.

To find HSI investigations, the authors searched both ICE and DOJ press releases. The search was tailored by filtering press releases by date and by using keyword searches for “Homeland Security Investigations” and “HSI.” The authors then examined each press release in the search results and ascertained if it was about a case HSI had investigated. Those that were determined relevant were included in the snapshot.⁶⁵

Once all the press releases were gathered, they were filtered further by removing any that discussed the same case as an earlier press release. For example, ICE published one press release in August 2020 about the arrest of someone and a second press release in September about charges against that person. Both these press releases were in reference to the same HSI investigation, so only one was included in the snapshot. In addition, if the same press release was cross-posted on both ICE and DOJ’s website, it was only included once. The results were compiled and organized by department. There were 157 press releases from ICE’s website and 21 from the DOJ’s website.⁶⁶

The press releases were then further broken down based on how the ICE and DOJ websites categorized the type of the HSI investigation.

The ICE categories included:

• Child Exploitation
• Contraband
• Counter Proliferation Investigation Unit
• COVID-19
• Cultural Property, Arts, and Antiquities Investigations
• Cyber Crimes
• Document and Benefit Fraud
• Enforcement and Removal
• Financial Crimes
• Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives
• Human Rights Violators
• Human Smuggling/Trafficking
• Intellectual Property Rights and Commercial Fraud
• Narcotics
• National Security
• Operational
• Transnational Gangs
• Worksite Enforcement

The DOJ categories included:

• Asset Forfeiture
• Civil Rights
• Consumer Protection
• Coronavirus
• Counterintelligence and Export Control
• Counterterrorism
• Cyber Crime
• Disaster Fraud
• Drug Trafficking
• Financial Fraud
• Foreign Corruption
• Human Smuggling
• Human Trafficking
• Identity Theft
• National Security
• Project Safe Childhood
• Securities, Commodities, and Investment Fraud
• Violent Crime

To better compare types of investigations, the authors analyzed each DOJ press release and assigned it to the ICE press release categories; all categories listed used in this paper reflect the ICE list. In some instances, a single category did not fully capture the issue areas of the investigation, so the authors examined each press release and determined if additional categories should be marked. As a result, a single press release may be classified in multiple categories.

About the Authors

Carrie F. Cordero is the Robert M. Gates senior fellow and general counsel at CNAS. Her research and writing interests focus on the intersection of law and national security, democracy and rule of law, intelligence community oversight, transparency, surveillance, cybersecurity, and related national and homeland security law and policy issues. She is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown Law and a CNN legal and national security analyst. Ms. Cordero spent the first part of her career in public service, including as counsel to the assistant attorney general for national security; senior associate general counsel at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and attorney advisor at the U.S. Department of Justice, during which time she handled critical counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations and appeared frequently before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. At the U.S. Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, she worked extensively on developing policies, procedures, and processes related to oversight, compliance, and protection of privacy and civil liberties in the context of government national security investigations and intelligence activities. She also served as a special assistant United States attorney. After leaving government service, Ms. Cordero was the director of national security studies at Georgetown Law and was in private practice, handling matters related to surveillance, law enforcement response, security, and privacy. She has testified before the U.S. Congress on surveillance reform and foreign influence on democratic institutions. Ms. Cordero earned her JD, cum laude, from Washington College of Law, American University, and her BA, magna cum laude, from Barnard College, Columbia University. Twitter: @carriecordero

Katie Galgano is a research assistant with the executive team at CNAS. Her research focuses on democracy and the rule of law and homeland security. Prior to joining CNAS, Katie interned with the Twenty First Century Group. She also interned with the U.S. Department of State in the Office of Global Women’s Issues and in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Katie graduated summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Baylor University with a BA in international studies. Twitter: @GalganoKatie

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the participants in a virtual roundtable of former Department of Homeland Security officials and other homeland security academic and policy experts held in May 2021. The authors are also grateful for the expert review and comments provided to earlier drafts of this paper by John Dermody and Faiza Patel. We are grateful to the current and former Homeland Security Investigations special agents and executives who were interviewed as part of the research supporting this paper. Thanks also go to the CNAS publications team for editing and design. This briefing paper and the ongoing research project are made possible by the generous support of Democracy Fund.