Leading the Free World

For the United States, supporting democracy is a matter of both values and interests. It helps mobilize the American public around U.S. foreign policy. It provides purpose and direction to Washington’s international efforts, beyond narrowly construed national interests. And history demonstrates that democracy promotion has been a powerful way to advance global stability.⁷

The task is urgent today. Freedom declined across the world for an 18th consecutive year in 2023.⁸ Beijing and Moscow seek a global order conducive to their own forms of authoritarian governance, and they work increasingly with countries such as Iran and North Korea in the pursuit of their preferred norms. They see their assault on democracy as a pursuit of strategic advantage, enabling them to enhance their own power by eroding the internal cohesion of democracies and the solidarity of democratic alliances.⁹ They wish to show that pluralism fragments a population, leaving it unable to produce results or project power that can match the strongmen. The future shape of global and domestic politics—whether based on liberal order and universal values or autocracy and might-makes-right—will be determined in significant part by how Washington engages the contest.

U.S. leadership in that contest appears particularly ill-timed to some. America’s domestic maladies are obvious and include deep partisan divisions, political gridlock, declining respect for democratic institutions and processes, and even politically motivated violence.¹⁰ Some observers suggest that, given America’s difficulties, it simply lacks the credibility to stand up for democracy and freedom elsewhere.¹¹ Others cite close U.S. ties with autocrats and wars of regime change to emphasize inconsistency and hypocrisy.¹² Amid sharpened great power competition, still others argue that a values-based foreign policy agenda is a luxury better suited for less contested times.¹³

Yet promoting democracy abroad and addressing deficiencies at home are not mutually exclusive activities—they are, rather, reinforcing lines of effort. Threats to democracy, after all, do not respect borders. The United States is not unique in experiencing political violence, deep divisions, or eroded trust in democratic processes. These and other pressing challenges, including state-based political interference, are often best addressed in concert with partners and allies.¹⁴ And societies, including our own, ebb and flow, but genuine democracies retain fixed ideals. America should embrace its founding principles and expand the enjoyment of universal rights and liberties. To abandon the effort because of our own flaws would be unfaithful to the fundamental idea of America.

It would also undermine U.S. security. Fostering democratic values not only aligns with America’s deepest ideals, but also helps create a more secure, stable world in which the United States can advance its national interests.¹⁵ Democracies are unlikely to go to war with one another, the United States’ closest allies are democracies, and its most reliable trade and investment partners are liberal societies.¹⁶ Open, transparent governance abroad is good for U.S. diplomatic, defense, and commercial relationships. A world in which the institutions of liberal democracy are strong is safer for the United States than one in which autocracy is on the prowl.¹⁷

If U.S. policymakers decline to seize the values imperative, they risk a world shaped by autocratic preferences and dominated by dictatorships. Acting now is the best chance to defend democracy and champion a robust agenda for protecting and enlarging the free world. The current administration and the next should recommit to putting human rights and democracy at the center of U.S. foreign policy.

The effort will need to go well beyond rhetorical exhortations. Washington must combine all instruments of national power to reinforce democracies, sustain them, and make them successful. Tradeoffs with other objectives will be inevitable, and an exhaustive list of activities goes beyond the scope of this analysis. We recommend, for a start, the actions below.

Expose human rights abuses and corruption. The U.S. government has effectively collected and declassified information about Russian depredations amid its war in Ukraine.¹⁸ Washington should do the same in cases of human rights violations. Doing so would employ public exposure to hold governments accountable for their actions—and possibly deter further abuses. At a minimum, such efforts could catalog human rights abuses and corruption for future efforts at accountability.

Counter corruption and hybrid threats. Washington should prioritize countering and building resilience to hybrid threats from authoritarian governments, including but not limited to weaponized corruption. Washington should identify and publicize instances of corruption by malign foreign actors. The Department of Justice can play an anticorruption role by boosting its efforts to monitor illicit commercial spyware and enforce antibribery laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Treasury Department may need greater funding to monitor corruption and implement sanctions against foreign transgressors.

Speak out. Senior policymakers and members of Congress should lend their voices and images to democratic dissidents and activists. This tool has fallen out of favor over the years but previously had been used to great effect by Republicans and Democrats alike.¹⁹ Meetings with political opposition figures, independent media actors, and others should be a regular feature of congressional delegations and administration trips abroad. Members of Congress and administration officials should direct speeches, opinion articles, resolutions, and statements at both the general human rights conditions of particular countries and individual actors who may be at risk.

Emphasize the role of Congress. Congress has historically served as a guardian of the democracy agenda and it should continue to do so today. In 2019, for instance, Republicans and Democrats alike blocked the White House’s attempt to slash foreign aid by an estimated $4 billion.²⁰ A bipartisan group introduced legislation earlier this year to hold Georgian officials accountable for corruption, human rights abuses, and antidemocratic efforts.²¹ Congressional initiative is essential to maintain focus on these issues across administrations and among competing White House priorities.

Protect individual privacy. Dictatorships today are more resilient in part because of how they harness technology—often of U.S. design and source—to influence and control their citizens.²² The United States should take better care to protect individual privacy as a basic right and foundation of democratic societies. The U.S. government has already taken steps to design an export and sanctions regime aimed at preventing the proliferation of hacking tools, facial recognition technology, and other surveillance technologies.²³ These efforts should be expanded. Future administrations should, for instance, examine the export of advanced U.S. semiconductors that can train AI systems aimed at social repression.

Partner with other democracies. The United States cannot defend its values without like-minded partners. In the past, for instance, each country subject to election interference responded individually and on an ad hoc basis.²⁴ A coalition of key democracies, adopting a mechanism akin to NATO’s Article 5, should pledge a collective, nonmilitary response to election interference by foreign states, such as compromising voting machines or illicitly hacking campaigns.²⁵ Democratic partners should also forge new issue-based multilateral groupings that collaborate in areas such as technology, foreign aid, and electoral assistance to ensure that each is infused with democratic values.

Contest authoritarianism in international organizations. Key international bodies, ranging from the UN Human Rights Council to more tailored groupings such as the International Telecommunication Union, have emerged as venues of competition between democracies and their autocratic opponents.²⁶ Washington should work with its allies to counter authoritarian influence in the multilateral system and promote liberal values in decision-making arenas.

Combat transnational repression. Transnational repression (TNR)—actions by a government to reach beyond its borders to stifle dissent, most commonly by suppressing democracy and human rights advocates—is on the rise. Countries such as China have attempted to harm dissidents even inside the United States, infringing on rights intrinsic to U.S. democracy.²⁷ A more vigorous approach is necessary to prevent autocratic waves from washing onto American shores. Washington should allocate increased funding to identify and combat such efforts, including through indictments, extraditions, sanctions, and other measures, and work more closely with allies to expose and arrest TNR elsewhere.

To these ends, policymakers should consider an incentive framework to deter acts of transnational repression, perhaps one modeled on the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) framework. The TIP report, published annually by the U.S. government, places countries into one of three tiers based on their efforts to combat human trafficking.²⁸ A similar framework could assess a government’s acts of transnational repression or its efforts to mitigate such acts.

Publicizing tiered rankings based on TNR, as has been done with the TIP framework, could incentivize governments to act. If incentives prove insufficient, more punitive approaches should be considered. Engaging in acts of transnational repression on U.S. soil, for example, could incur reduced arms sales or diplomatic sanctions. U.S. officials should also take steps to better enforce existing laws, including by implementing Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act.²⁹ That provision enables the president to prohibit arms transfers to countries that habitually intimidate or harass individuals in the United States.

Increase transparency. Military assistance to front-line states such as Ukraine is vital, as are sanctions and other punitive measures levied against Russia and other autocratic aggressors. Oversight of and transparency in such regimes would help ensure that Washington is aiding only those worthy of American support and punishing entities undermining key values. It may also enhance the domestic political sustainability of such efforts. Instead of neglecting congressional oversight for enormous defense aid packages, for instance, Washington should integrate oversight mechanisms into them across both the executive and legislative branches.³⁰ Providing Congress with the details of sanctions regimes should receive similar attention.

Prioritize budgets. Effective work on democracy or human rights requires appropriate funding—some of which is wanting. The administration’s FY25 budget request allocates over $3 billion for bolstering global democracy—up $88 million compared with the FY23 enacted level, including investments in the Summit for Democracy.³¹ That funding is, however, spread across projects as varied as election assistance and new infrastructure in emerging democracies—making it a less impressive amount than at first glance.³² It also remains far outpaced by the increased global demand for democracy assistance. Individuals around the world risk their lives in the pursuit of democracy and liberal values, from soldiers fighting in Ukraine to Afghan women resisting social and political exclusion.³³ Washington, together with its allies, should meet their needs with the urgency—and financing—they deserve.

Conclusion

The above actions are designed to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. More important than any one recommendation is adopting a sense of gravity and urgency. Democracy and human rights are declining around the world.³⁴ Autocracies are on the march and working together to overturn key elements of liberal international order.³⁵ The United States, for all its flaws and other priorities, remains the indispensable champion of values and rights abroad. Now is the time to fuse values with interests at the core of U.S. foreign policy and to go on the offense. The United States must contest the expansion of dictatorship, outcompete autocracies, and demonstrate that democracies work—individually and together—more effectively than strongmen ever can.

The good news is that America is wholly equipped to answer such a call to arms. It possesses the population, the geography, the resources, the allies, and the experience to support democracy and fundamental rights everywhere. Doing so is no easy task, and it involves difficult tradeoffs and judgments. But the global situation has grown more dire. It requires a renewed American commitment today.

This paper is the product of a bipartisan task force that examined the role that democracy and human rights do and should play in U.S. foreign policy. While individual signatories may differ on particular points herein, all endorse the broad scope of the paper’s analysis and recommendations.

About the Authors

Richard Fontaine is the chief executive officer of the Center for a New American Security.

Shanthi Kalathil is a visiting senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Tod Lindberg is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.

Tom Malinowski is an American politician and diplomat who was the U.S. representative from New Jersey’s 7th Congressional District from 2019 to 2023.

Sarah Margon is the U.S. foreign policy director at the Open Society Foundations.

Gibbs McKinley is research associate to the CEO at the Center for a New American Security.

Derek Mitchell is a nonresident senior advisor to the Office of the President and the Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Nicole Bibbins Sedaca is the interim president of Freedom House.

Corban Teague is director of the Human Rights & Freedom Program at the McCain Institute at Arizona State University.

Daniel Twining is president of the International Republican Institute.

The author affiliations indicated above are for identification purposes and do not imply institutional endorsements of this report’s contents.

Acknowledgments

This report would not have been possible without contributions from our colleagues at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), including Emma Swislow and Maura McCarthy. The project that produced it was made possible with the generous support of Humanity United.

As a research and policy institution committed to the highest standards of organizational, intellectual, and personal integrity, CNAS maintains strict intellectual independence and sole editorial direction and control over its ideas, projects, publications, events, and other research activities. CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues, and the content of CNAS publications reflects the views of their authors alone. In keeping with its mission and values, CNAS does not engage in lobbying activity and complies fully with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and, to the extent that the Center accepts funding from non-U.S. sources, its activities will be limited to bona fide scholastic, academic, and research-related activities, consistent with applicable federal law. The Center publicly acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.