November 12, 2024

Russia and China in Central Asia

Cooperate, Compete, or De-conflict?

Executive Summary

Despite the many proclamations that Russian and Chinese interests would collide in Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing continue to work together in service of their shared objectives. These include, most importantly, keeping the United States and the West—and democracy—out of the region, maintaining stability, and pursuing economic benefits.

Fissures between Moscow and Beijing exist, especially in the economic sphere, where China has become the more dominant power, and over the potential development of the Middle Corridor trade route, which could significantly disadvantage Russia. However, Russia and China are managing these divergences, and the overarching imperative to weaken the United States provides a powerful motive for reducing or preventing any friction from derailing their broader partnership.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened the Central Asian states’ apprehensions about Russia, including about its capacity to uphold its security role in the region. However, the Kremlin remains committed to maintaining its influence in the region, and the war in Ukraine is restructuring economic dynamics in ways that will enable the Kremlin to limit the extent of its declining economic influence.

Looking forward, the most significant change in Russia-China relations in Central Asia is likely to occur in the security sphere, where China is likely to take on a greater role, especially as Russia’s military and security services are preoccupied in Ukraine and with the domestic challenges the war creates. Any rise in instability in the region—which could result from an uptick in terrorist threats in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, or from the region’s brittle autocracies—could propel China to step into a sphere where Russia has historically played the primary role but that the Kremlin will struggle to fulfill while the war in Ukraine continues.

Looking forward, the most significant change in Russia-China relations in Central Asia is likely to occur in the security sphere.

For Russia and China, Central Asia is also likely to be an important building block in their larger counterorder-building effort. The two countries are likely to sustain—and step up—their efforts to build an alternative order in Central Asia, including by deepening cooperation and broadening the number of countries participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to legitimize and demonstrate the benefits of their collective global leadership. This effort will face resistance from the Central Asian states that object to the concept of a Russia-China condominium of power in their region and have shown an ability to come together to resist attempts to turn the SCO into a forum that would strengthen a collective Russia-China security role in the region.

The United States has an opportunity to redouble its engagement in Central Asia. The Central Asian states highly value U.S. political support for their independence and sovereignty, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington can encourage greater connectivity and cohesion among the countries, demonstrating its support for their increasing cooperation with one another in ways that could strengthen the region’s economic attractiveness and political agency. This contrasts with the way in which Russia has traditionally dealt with the region, which is to try to capitalize on divisions and disputes among the countries.

While it cannot match China dollar for dollar or supplant Russia’s cultural and political influence in the region, the United States can enhance its trade, investment, energy, counterterrorism, and diplomatic ties to these countries. Enhancing U.S. and European investment in Central Asia, especially for development of the Middle Corridor, could help prevent Russia and China from further deepening their grip on the region.

Introduction

Since the announcement of the Russia-China “no limits” partnership in February 2022 and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine just days later, observers have sought to assess how the two countries’ relations will evolve, including in Central Asia—a region long thought to be a potential source of friction. Several experts have pointed to competition over energy resources, transit routes, trade, political influence, and security relationships as factors that will hinder their ability to share power or form a kind of joint condominium over the region. So far, those expectations have not been borne out, as their overarching geopolitical imperative to undermine the United States and the order it leads has provided powerful motivation to prevent any sources of friction from derailing their broader agenda. If anything, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has catalyzed deeper cooperation between the two—a trend that is likely to carry over into their relations in Central Asia.

The landlocked former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan—bound by the Caspian Sea to the west, Iran and Afghanistan to the south, China to the east, and Russia to the north—are seeking to rebalance their foreign policies following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and to reach out to nations other than China and Russia to bolster their economic and security options. The Central Asian nations still look to the United States and Europe, as well as the Gulf states and East Asian partners, to support their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity—issues that have taken on new importance following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But they also appreciate that Russia and China do not press them on democracy and human rights issues. Given these competing interests, Central Asian nations—with Kazakhstan in the lead—will continue to pursue engagement with multiple nations and keep their options open to avoid overdependence on any one country or bloc of nations.

The Central Asian nations still look to the United States and Europe, as well as the Gulf states and East Asian partners, to support their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

This paper argues that while the Central Asian states will seek to balance against the growing cooperation and combined influence of Russia and China in their region, Moscow and Beijing are likely to sustain cooperation in service of their shared objectives. These include keeping the United States and Europe out of the region and advancing their shared notions of indivisible security—or the idea that one state’s safety should not come at the expense of another’s—and the centrality of state-determined political rights. For Russia and China, Central Asia is likely to be an important building block in their larger effort to create an alternative global order. Central Asia provides them with a region to legitimize and demonstrate the benefits of their collective global leadership. The war in Ukraine, however, is altering their current arrangement, in which China is the dominant economic power while Russia is the primary external security provider. The longer the war in Ukraine continues, the more likely it becomes that China will continue its gradual trajectory of assuming a larger security presence in the region—a reality that Moscow is likely to tolerate while its military is degraded, and China’s actions remain consistent with their shared objectives.

The first section of this paper identifies key changes in the region since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that create the context for assessing the future trajectory of Russia-China relations in Central Asia. The second section identifies the drivers that are likely to shape the future of their relationship in the region. The third section provides an assessment of where Russia-China relations are most likely to head in the region over the next three to five years. Finally, it examines the implications for the United States and its allies.

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to all the experts who provided input and participated in the roundtables that informed this report, especially Reid Standish and Alex Cooley, who provided valuable feedback on an earlier draft of the report. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone, and any errors that remain are the responsibility of the authors alone. This report was made possible with the generous support of the Russia Strategic Initiative, U.S. European Command.

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About the Authors

Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a senior fellow and director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). She works on national security challenges facing the United States and Europe, focusing on Russia, authoritarianism and threats to democracy, and the state of the transatlantic alliance. From 2015 to 2018, she was deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council.

Lisa Curtis is a senior fellow and director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. Her work focuses on U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific, with a particular focus on U.S.-India strategic relations; Quad (United States, Australia, India, and Japan) cooperation; democracy and counterterrorism issues in South and Central Asia; and China’s role in the region. She has over 20 years of service in the U.S. government, including at the National Security Council (NSC), CIA, State Department, and Capitol Hill, having most recently served as deputy assistant to the president and NSC senior director for South and Central Asia from 2017 to 2021.

Kate Johnston is an associate fellow for the Transatlantic Security Program at CNAS. She focuses on Russian malign influence in the Global South, and threats to democracy.

Nathaniel Schochet is a former program administrator for the Indo-Pacific Security Program at CNAS.

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Authors

  • Andrea Kendall-Taylor

    Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program

    Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at CNAS. She works on national security challenges facing the United States and Eur...

  • Lisa Curtis

    Senior Fellow and Director, Indo-Pacific Security Program

    Lisa Curtis is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is a foreign policy and national security expert with over 20 years of service in...

  • Kate Johnston

    Associate Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program

    Kate Johnston is an Associate Fellow with the Transatlantic Security Program at CNAS. Immediately prior to joining CNAS, Kate worked as a Research Associate for Princeton’s I...

  • Nathaniel Schochet

    Former Program Administrator, Indo-Pacific Security Program

    Nathaniel Schochet is a former Program Administrator for the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He graduated in May 2020 from Hob...

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