The Russia Stability Tracker

There have always been factions and elite infighting in Russia, with Putin arbitrating between them. In this way, elite divisions facilitate a myth of Putin as the necessary arbiter between these factions and central to the stability of the political system. The war in Ukraine has exacerbated these fissures, as some elites question whether Putin is taking Russia in the right direction and whether he has the staying power to be the one best positioned to protect their future interests.

Elite fissures have become more visible—namely, Prigozhin and Kadyrov have been critical of the Kremlin’s war effort, especially that of the Ministry of Defense (MoD). However, the experts were divided over how significant these divisions are. On the one hand, the fact that the divisions have spilled into the public domain may signal that the regime is less willing to or capable of cracking down on opposition, increasing their willingness to challenge the regime in the future. On the other hand, no inner-circle elites have lost their jobs, suggesting that the core remains strong. Moreover, any coordination against Putin is potentially extremely costly, creating tremendous barriers to organization against the regime.

The Kremlin has largely increased its control over Russia’s media environment. The regime’s crackdown on journalists and independent media outlets, and its moves to silence anti-regime narratives, have strengthened the regime’s control. While many Russians use virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass these restrictions, the government is taking steps to limit access to VPNs. Most Russians, therefore, still receive their information from state media, in particular, state television. The Kremlin’s control over the information environment ensures that many Russians receive only the Kremlin’s version of the war in Ukraine—a factor that contributes to apparently high Russian support for the war in Ukraine.

In some cases, especially in the realm of war bloggers, there have been voices critical of Moscow’s war effort. Frequently, however, critical voices often deflect blame away from Putin himself. The regime appears aware of the risks that pro-war bloggers and other critics pose and is taking steps to rein them in. The regime also appears to retain the capacity to co-opt radical voices.

Russia’s economy is worse off because of its invasion of Ukraine and the resulting sanctions and export controls designed to constrain the Russian military and government’s ability to sustain the war. The contracting economy will heighten elite divisions as they fight over shrinking pieces of the economic pie. Indeed, personalist autocracies like Putin’s Russia are the most sensitive to economic downturns. For now, however, the elite understand that they can hang together or hang separately—meaning they recognize that destabilizing actions risk bringing down the regime they benefit from.

The Russian public will also grow more discontented as a result of deteriorating economic conditions, creating fertile fodder for future challenges to the regime should a catalyst emerge. The government’s imperative to sustain the war means it will likely insulate (if not increase) defense spending at the expense of public expenditure, further hurting average Russians. Poor economic conditions on their own, however, are unlikely to destabilize Putin, and numerous autocrats have shown that they can muddle through poor economic conditions for prolonged periods.

Even before the war, Russia suffered from significant brain drain. Russia’s invasion accelerated the departure of the most politically active Russians—those who may have been willing to challenge the regime. By some estimates, somewhere near 200,000 Russians left the country in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. After Putin’s announcement of “partial mobilization” in September 2022, up to 300,000 more people are estimated to have left Russia within a single week. The exodus of these Russians provides a pressure release valve for the regime, as there are now few remaining Russians who would be willing to catalyze and organize opposition to the regime.

Before the war in Ukraine, there was an extremely low risk that the military would intervene in the political system. That risk remains low, although Prigozhin’s success on the battlefield (relative to Russia’s armed forces) could raise concerns in the MoD that Prigozhin’s Wagner Group stands to increase its influence and access to government resources at the MoD’s expense. Research shows that military perceptions of government actions that threaten to undermine military equities raise a country’s coup risk.¹ This dynamic may have shaped Putin’s decision to demote General Sergei Surovikin and appoint General Valery Gerasimov—a move many saw as Putin siding with Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Gerasimov in their confrontation with Prigozhin and Kadyrov. The long-standing loyalty of Shoigu and Gerasimov, however, underscores that the military’s threat to Putin remains very low.

The security services continue to appear loyal to Putin and the regime; there have been no visible signs of defection. The maintenance of this perception itself is important—if people perceive the security services as loyal, it lowers their propensity to challenge the regime because they expect the security services to respond robustly. There were some signs of disapproval of the war among Putin’s National Guard early in 2022—more than 100 national guardsmen were fired for refusing to fight in Ukraine. There have not been other visible signs of dissatisfaction that the experts are aware of. If anything, the security services may have increased their influence, as Putin relies more heavily on them to repress society.

Although Putin does not stand in genuinely competitive elections, the popularity of autocrats matters, because strong popularity serves as a signal to elite challengers that any effort to oppose the leader is futile. Members of the elite will be less willing to challenge a leader who appears popular. So far, Putin maintains public support, although there are serious challenges to gauging citizens’ true preferences about a leader in such a repressive environment. Polling from Levada showed Putin’s public approval at 81 percent in December 2022.² Public approval for Putin is likely in part a product of the lack of a viable alternative to him, and if one emerged, public support could quickly shift.

The Kremlin has come to rely increasingly on repression to maintain its hold on power. The trend toward greater repression pre-dates Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin had already increased its crackdown on all facets of Russian civil society in the run-up to parliamentary elections in September 2021.³ But since the invasion, the regime’s reliance on repression has grown, and there are no visible signs that members of the security services or elite are questioning that repression is an appropriate and useful means to maintain control. In fact, the Kremlin increased spending on internal security—an indicator of both concern with unrest and its willingness to increase repressive capacity to manage it. The Ministry of Internal Affairs staff is set to increase by 40,000 people by 2025, after staying the same for eight years.⁴

Research shows that repression is helpful to the durability of an autocracy.⁵ However, it does create broad discontent that can be more readily converted into protests. Unanticipated triggers—outrage over wartime casualties, the downfall of the Iranian regime, the blundering of a second round of mobilization—could catalyze protests, especially if multiple crises converged.

Putin has always invoked fear of the collective West to portray himself as uniquely qualified to protect Russia and justify repression. The war has allowed Putin to double down on portraying Russia as under siege from the United States and NATO. Putin and state-controlled media outlets portray the war in Ukraine as being about far more than Ukraine and push the idea that the West seeks to break up Russia.