The Russia Stability Tracker

Elite fissures—most notably Yevgeny Prigozhin’s very public and very personal criticisms of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov—remain highly visible, but they still do not constitute a clear threat to domestic stability. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s refusal to comply with a Russian military order that would require Wagner Group fighters to sign a formal contract with Russia’s defense ministry by July 1 is the latest flashpoint in the long running feud. Yevgeny Prigozhin is still not a threat to Putin, but instead, his presence in the political discourse makes Putin look reasonable by comparison. In addition, the leaked tape of a conversation between Iosif Prigozhin and Farkhad Akhmedov, two second-tier oligarchs in Russia, contained damning assessments of the Russian leadership that likely captured sentiment that is more broadly held among the economic elite. Despite the possible discontent, such individuals have little capacity to change the distribution of power among the elite. However, the public nature of the disputes and criticism of the regime could signal the possibility of greater room to discuss shortcomings in the war, which could become more difficult for the Kremlin to control in the future.

The Kremlin has tightened its control over the information environment since February 2023. The arrest of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich is the latest example of the security services breaking norms around the relationship between the media and the Russian state. It also facilitates greater regime control over the information environment. With Gershkovich’s arrest, the Kremlin has sent a clear message that reporting in Russia is no longer safe. As Polina Ivanova, a Russia correspondent for Financial Times, stated: “It has a chilling effect for everyone.” With fewer journalists from Western media outlets reporting on Russia, the broader information environment will suffer. Russians can still use virtual private networks (VPNs), YouTube, and Telegram to get alternative information, but many choose not to. There is evidence that more people are tuning out and not seeking information about the war.

The Ukraine-linked attacks inside Russia—including the drone attack on the Kremlin and the raids into Belgorod—however, have created challenges to the Kremlin’s ability to control the information environment and portray the Russian government as competent and in control. The limited raids and border shelling in Belgorod were and have the potential to be a focal point for criticism against Putin and his image as a competent leader.

Since February 2022, estimates of the economic damage caused by the war and the resulting sanctions have been progressively reduced. The Russian economy is stagnant with chronic problems, but Russia’s economic challenges are not likely to become critical to Putin’s stability in the near future. The sharp decline in oil and gas revenue in the first quarter of the year suggests that sanctions are having an impact on state revenue. Given the massive reserves that the Kremlin amassed in the last year, however, it will take some time for Moscow to feel this revenue crunch. So far, ordinary Russians have not felt the pinch of sanctions, although certain sectors of the economy have. Assembly lines for some cars have closed because of the lack of necessary components, as the impact of lower oil prices is beginning to be felt, for example. Economic challenges resulting from declining government revenue, coupled with higher defense spending and social spending—where there will be pressure to do more ahead of presidential elections scheduled for 2024—may become harder to manage in the medium and long term.

Little has changed since February 2023. As many as one million Russians have now left the country and they continue to provide a pressure release valve for the regime. Outside Russia, there is not much they can do to influence what happens inside Russia, and there are divisions among them as different individuals and groups put forward their own competing visions for Russia’s future.

Notably, the Kremlin introduced electronic draft notices in April 2023, a move intended to make it more difficult for people to avoid being drafted and for those avoiding conscription to leave the country. Russia’s military service rules previously required the draft notices to be delivered in person, which meant that many Russians avoided the draft by avoiding their address of record. Under the new law, conscripts who fail to show up for service would be prohibited from leaving Russia, would have their driver’s licenses suspended, and would be barred from selling their apartments and other assets. If there is another mobilization, observers will see if the new measures effectively prevent Russians from leaving the country to avoid fighting in the war.

So far, the military remains in its apolitical box and its threat to Putin remains low. The sparring between Yevgeny Prigozhin and Shoigu still does not constitute a serious direct threat to the regime, and, if anything, Putin appears to have put Yevgeny Prigozhin in his place and made clear his support for Shoigu and Gerasimov. The ongoing war is reducing the military’s organizational bandwidth required for coup planning. If anti-government sentiment were to grow, it would probably spill over outside of institutional channels, including the possibility that armed groups outside the traditional military could vie for power, which could lead to an insurgency akin to recent events in Sudan.

No change and no meaningful development over this reporting period.

To the extent that polls on Russian public opinion are reliable, polls since February 2023 suggest that Putin’s approval ratings stand at over 80 percent (on par with the December 2022 polls). Putin has benefited from a “rally around the flag” effect, in which people set aside political differences during a war and support their leader. Even though many Russians might not have supported the decision to invade Ukraine, now that they are at war, they support Putin for fear of what losing might bring. Putin has gone to great lengths to provoke these anxieties. He has framed the war in Ukraine as being “about the very existence of our country”—a fear-mongering tactic useful for compelling compliance with the regime.

Yet, while support for Putin appears high, polling on other indicators suggests a more complex picture. When asked to name five or six politicians that one trusts, just 41 percent named Putin. The next highest figure was Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin at 15 percent. Moreover, public opinion toward the war continues to be quite mixed, with just as many Russians preferring that the Kremlin begin negotiations to end the war as those who favor continuing the war. The introduction of the digital draft notices (if successful) and fear of a new round of mobilization may also increase latent, if not open, opposition among the mass public.

Repression inside Russia continues to rise. All potential centers of alternative information— Memorial, the Sakharov Center, and the Sova Centre—have been shut down. Russian opposition figure Vladimir Kara-Murza was given an unprecedented 25-year sentence for “treason” for lectures he gave outside of Russia. Gershkovich is awaiting his trial on espionage, a move designed to deter any foreign journalists from writing about the war if their work does not follow the Russian narrative. Russian theater director Yevgenia Berkovich was arrested and accused of “terrorism” for staging a play about Russian women who joined ISIS. However, rising repression has not yet triggered opposition in the public; even extreme forms of repression have not provoked public outcry. There are also few signs of opposition within the security services to some of the more extreme forms of repression.

Putin is amplifying the besieged fortress narrative and using this narrative to mobilize Russian society in support of not just the war in Ukraine, but in his larger confrontation with the West. Historically, Putin has sought to demobilize Russian society—to instill apathy and passivity to maintain political control. Since Putin began the war, however, he has been forced to put Russia on wartime footing and announce a “partial mobilization,” calling up 300,000 Russians to fight in Ukraine. Society is being militarized and public acts of support are growing, including incidents of Russians reporting on the “anti-patriotic” activities of their fellow citizens. Ukrainian-linked attacks inside Russia provide additional fodder for Kremlin narratives that the conflict in Ukraine is existential for Russia. This transition to a more mobilized society can reinforce Putin’s control in the near term, but could ultimately prove difficult for the regime to control.