The $100 Billion Question

Range of Potential Savings

We assess the minimum cost avoidance at about $30 billion over 30 years, with a more likely cost avoidance in excess of $100 billion.

• Because the cost of FNA is not yet known, we use a parametric cost model to examine a range of possible costs, depending on assumptions regarding cost of a next-generation aircraft.
• The Navy can achieve this cost avoidance only by replacing manned aircraft with uninhabited aircraft.
• These substantial savings could then be re-invested into other Navy priorities, such as additional ships, submarines, or other aircraft programs.
• These savings do not include real and highly substantial funds that could be saved by reductions in the initial pilot training infrastructure and supporting depot infrastructure.
• This is a “think piece” with many simplifying assumptions and is intended to illustrate the principles of what is different with uninhabited aircraft.

Introduction

The Navy is already beginning to examine options to replace the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, which will retire in the mid-2030s.

The replacement of the F/A-18E/F with a future naval aircraft (FNA) represents a major opportunity to shape the Navy’s future carrier air wing to respond to emerging challenges but must take into account budget constraints.

This analysis examines the potential cost differences between a notional human-inhabited FNA and an uninhabited FNA.

• This analysis isolates cost issues alone. It assumes that technology has matured to the point where an uninhabited aircraft with a high degree of autonomy and communications links to human operators would be at least equal in capability to a human-inhabited aircraft.
• Uninhabited aircraft also have significant operational advantages over human-inhabited aircraft due to their ability to operate beyond the endurance limits of human pilots, which this analysis does not include.

The U.S. carrier fleet is trained and organized for two readiness objectives: To generate continuously a certain number of deployed carrier groups – currently two carrier strike groups, and to generate temporarily a larger surge deployment capability – up to six carrier strike groups.

Each alternative force examined must yield sufficient aircraft, including training, depot, and attrition aircraft, to meet both the steady-state (two carriers) and temporary surge (six carriers) requirements.

The Navy has 11 aircraft carriers, supporting 10 carrier strike groups.¹

The carriers rotate through a regular 36-month readiness cycle, moving through periods of maintenance, pre-deployment preparation, deployment, and then a lengthy sustainment period where they are available for surge, as needed.

At 25 years, a carrier needs to enter deep maintenance for a refueling and complex overhaul of its nuclear reactor, a process which takes approximately four years.

Under the Navy’s new Optimized Fleet Response Plan, at any given point in time there are roughly two carriers deployed, four available for surge, two in maintenance, two preparing for another deployment, and one in deep maintenance.²

What’s Different for Uninhabited Aircraft?

First-generation uninhabited air vehicles (UAVs) were remotely controlled by a pilot on the ground, but newer UAVs are highly automated. Remote pilots (“operators”) command the aircraft and tell it where to go, and the aircraft flies itself.

We assume that cost differences unique to human-inhabited vs. uninhabited aircraft variants are sufficiently small that they can be excluded. Differences in life-cycle cost will therefore be driven by the number of aircraft purchased and the way these aircraft are operated.

Aircraft Life-cycle Costs

Total costs throughout an aircraft program consist of research and development (R&D), investment (aircraft production), operating and support (O&S), and disposal. Since R&D costs are driven primarily by mission requirements, which would be the same for both aircraft variants, this study will focus on investment costs and operating and support costs. 

Human-Inhabited FNA

First, we estimate the cost of a notional human-inhabited FNA as a base case. In order to meet the requirements of two carriers deployed steady-state and the ability to surge up to six, 463 total aircraft are needed.³

The number of aircraft is determined by:

• 24 aircraft per air wing for all 10 carrier air wings (carrier in deep maintenance does not require an air wing);
• 144 aircraft to meet six wing surge demand continuously present on carriers;
• Training squadron = 37% of carrier aircraft = 89 aircraft;⁴
• Aircraft at depot maintenance = 15% x (carrier + training aircraft) = 49 aircraft;⁵
• Attrition occurs at an average rate of three losses per 100K hours flown = 85 aircraft over a 25-year fleet service life;⁶ and
• 31 flying hours per aircraft per month for aircraft in the 10 air wings; 23 flying hours per aircraft per month in the training squadron.⁷

Excluding R&D and disposal costs, total program life-cycle costs will consist of the costs to procure the aircraft plus the O&S costs to operate and support them over a 25-year lifespan.⁸

Since the precise costs of an FNA are not known, this analysis uses a parametric cost model, based on actual F/A-18E operating costs and anticipated F-35C costs.⁹ Three cases are presented, representing a range of estimates for the anticipated increase in costs for a next-generation FNA relative to the F-35C:

1. No increase in costs relative to the F-35C;
2. A modest increase in costs relative to the F-35C; or
3. A significant increase in costs relative to the F-35C, equivalent to the increase in costs from the F/A-18E to F-35C.

Since the key variable is the difference between an uninhabited and a human-inhabited FNA, a rough order-of-magnitude estimate of FNA costs is sufficient to understand the potential for cost savings.

Uninhabited FNA – Conservative Case

The conservative case estimates the cost savings from a single change: a reduction in the number of aircraft required in the training squadron. Because the UAV flies itself, remote pilots/operators do not need to train on aircraft handling skills. Moreover, because there is no “seat-of-the-pants” feel gained from flying the aircraft, a significant fraction of mission training can be done via simulator, reserving actual aircraft flying for final exercises.¹⁰

In the conservative case:

• Training aircraft are reduced to 16 aircraft. These are used for handler and maintainer training (who require hands-on experience with the aircraft) and squadron-level joint training exercises with manned aircraft.
• This results in a reduction in the number of aircraft at the depot.
• A reduced training squadron means fewer hours flown and a corresponding reduction in the number of attrition aircraft.¹¹
• The number of aircraft allocated to each carrier air wing remains unchanged, as does the number of flying hours per month.
• 144 aircraft meets the six wing surge demand continuously present on carriers.